though the postmodern critic Frederic Jameson is a more accessible source. In The Political Unconscious Jameson argues that interpretation "always presupposes, if not a conception of the unconscious itself, then at least some mechanism of mystification or repression in terms of which it would make sense to seek a latent meaning behind a manifest one, or to rewrite the surface categories of a text in the stronger language of a more fundamental interpretive code". 4 A symptomatic reading, in other words, pays attention to exclusions as opposed to surface content, and invites us to reconstruct the text to fill the gaps and silences that have been identified -an example is Ashley's 'Living on Borderlines: Man, Post-structuralism and War' which offers a symptomatic reading of Man, The State and War, bringing out the ways in which the text escapes the control of the author, at some points privileging 'man' at others 'the state'. 5 There is something to be said for this approach; exclusions and omissions clearly are important and the author cannot be allowed to exercise authority over the interpretation of a text -but, still, such a reading is always open to the charge that one can make of any text whatever one wishes to. Rather than a symptomatic reading, but not wholly divorced from the idea, I would prefer to approach texts along contextualist lines -that is, we must read texts in contexts; more specifically, we must treat texts as speech-acts, and ask not just what the author is saying, but also what the author is doing. 6 Symptoms are important here, but what this centrally involves is an attempt to recreate as far as possible the context within which the author wrote; most of all, we must not assume that an author is addressing a timeless set of problems, much less a set of problems that we happen to be concerned with.
This is a very difficult task, for two reasons. To illustrate the first, consider Quentin
Skinner's work on Hobbes; a prodigious scholar with a command of the relevant classical and early-modern languages which has rarely been equalled, Skinner is 2 probably familiar with everything that might have influenced Hobbes's work.
Skinner's scholarship explicitly reflects this reading and so can claim to place Hobbes in his contemporary context -by following Skinner we can, in principle, see what
worried Hobbes and what he wanted to do with his texts. It is impossible to imaging this kind of depth of context being available to even the most learned and industrious commentators on modern writers -we can do our best, but our best is bound to fall short of the ideal.
But there is a second, more intractable problem, which is perhaps best illustrated by a musical analogy. Consider the post 1945 movement towards 'authenticity' in classical music, the attempt to recreate the conditions under which works by e.g. Bach terminology of a self-help system and his use of economic models, and I critiqued his assumption that he was producing explanatory (as opposed to 'metaphysical') theory -but I did not anticipate that these positions would transmute into the rational-choice versions of neorealism subsequently popular, that the behaviour of egoistic actors under anarchy (the 'anarchy problematic') would be studied by the use of increasingly complex econometric models. In my defence, I suspect Waltz himself did not anticipate this denouement -later statements and interviews suggests as much. 10 Still, even accepting that there are elements of the argument I didn't pick up then, it still seems there is a big gap between my take on Waltz's position in 1980, and its later reception. How is this gap to be explained? In two ways, I think, one a matter of rhetoric, the other a matter of substance. The rhetorical points concern, first, the way in which authors present themselves, and, second, the way in which they critique others. As to the first point, there is a basic divide to be seen in academic argumentation between those who in their own work stress continuity and those who stress rupture. In practice, we all stand on the shoulders of giants, as did the giants themselves and there is always a degree of continuity between even the most innovative work and past efforts in the field -the difference is whether, and to what degree, any particular writer is moved to acknowledge that link.
Waltz in Theory of
International Politics is closer to the latter camp than the former; he does not make positive claims for great originality, but neither does he emphasise the links between his work and that of earlier realists (as we will see below, Man, the State and War is a different kind of book, and there the problem is rather of discerning when Waltz is speaking in his own voice, and when he is reporting the work of others). There is an interesting contrast here with, say Robert Gilpin, whose response to being identified as a neorealist by Richard Ashley was to deny vigorously the charge, stressing the way in which he represents the rich tradition of political realism. 11 In the same Instead he simply sets out in detail and defends his original arguments.
This insouciance is, in many ways, admirable, but it does help critics to make the point that his work represents a clear break with the past, if they wish to do so -and they often will, because this leads into the second rhetorical point about the way in which academics criticise each other. A very familiar ploy here is the one Waltz notes in his comment on Ashley. In order to undermine the position of an author with whom one disagrees quite profoundly, it is helpful to be able to make the case that their position does not simply contradict one's own but also that of some acknowledged past masters within the author's own discourse. In effect, the ploy is to try to use people who would have been your enemies in the past to combat someone who is your enemy in the present. These figures from the past are praised for their sagacity in order to belittle the present foe. But, although this is part of the story, it is only part of the story -there is another reason why Waltz's work is seem as instituting a serious break with the past and that concerns the much wider issue of how that past is understood. What actually are the roots of realism, and is Waltz's structuralist account actually out of line with those roots? The rest of this chapter is devoted to this question, and, as will become apparent, the matter hinges on an examination of the role of human nature in classical realist thought. The argument for a rupture between Waltzian neorealism and classical realism rests partly on the proposition that human nature plays less of a role for Waltz than it does for the classics -I want to suggest that while this is indeed the case, the way in which Waltz handles the issue of human nature can be related to both the major strands of realist thought, although, at the same time, it is distanced from them.
Waltz, Human Nature and the Roots of Realism
The central problem for those who wish to argue against the discontinuity thesis is embryonic statement of the security dilemma). 15 He makes the structuralist case more explicitly later in the text when he puts into the mouths of the Athenian representative the proposition that they were compelled to expand their empire by necessity, and that the Spartans would have done the same had they been in a similar situation -the Athenian speech here is a nice early statement of the tenets of 'offensive realism'.
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Waltz understandably cites these and similar passages in Thucydides -the problem is one can find with equal ease statements in the same source which put the real driving force behind the war elsewhere. In the same speech cited above, the Athenians state,
[we] have done nothing remarkable, nor contrary to ordinary human behaviour, if we not only accepted an empire when it was offered but also did not let it go, submitting to the great forces of prestige, fear and self-interestnot as the originators of such conduct, moreover, since the rule has always existed that the weaker is held down by the stronger… 17 Later, the Athenians make the same point in the 'Melian Dialogue'.
According to our understanding, divinity, it would seem, and mankind, as has always been obvious, are under an innate compulsion to rule whenever empowered.
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Human nature is the driving force, to which individuals and peoples must submit, are under an innate compulsion.
The other classical writer favoured by structural realists is Rousseau, whose parable of the stag hunt is a staple for students of rational choice and the logic (and dilemmas) of collective action. Thus..
If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain faithfully at his post; but if a hare happened to pass within the reach of one of them, we cannot doubt that he would have gone off in pursuit of it without scruple and, having caught his own prey, he would have cared very little about having caused his companions to lose theirs. 19 This is frequently used to illustrate the imperatives of a self-help system; 'everyone' would behave in this way because everyone would behave in this way -in other words we have to assume that if we don't chase the hare someone else will, or if we are the only person who has seen the hare and so this does not apply, we have to assume that there may be another hare which someone else will see and chase and so on. Either way the stag will be lost and we will go hungry, so we had better act now.
But, again, it is the assumptions that Rousseau makes about human nature that do the work in this case; it is because human beings are unscrupulous in the pursuit of their own interests, and have little concern for the interests of others that they act in this way. 20 In short, both Thucydides and Rousseau are ultimately offering first-image accounts of the motor of realism -and they are the best friends Waltz can find within the classical literature on the subject. For Augustine and the Augustinians, ancient and modern, political leaders are obliged to operate in a fallen world -the city of man as opposed to the city of God -and therefore must be wise and prudential (also, it is to be hoped, just) wielders of power, and this has nothing to do with structural features of the international politics of late antiquity (or the early 21 st century); for Augustine, the hierarchical polity that was collapsing around his ears was as much a context as the incipient anarchical system being created by the barbarian tribes who were overrunning the Empire. 21 Again, Machiavelli simply takes it for granted that politics is about the pursuit of interests; thus, the unstated assumption is that the Duke Valentino seeks to extend his power simply because he can -no further explanation is required -and if you want to preserve your power, or that of the city, (The Prince) or to preserve republican forms of government (The Discourses) you had better be aware that this is the way of the world.
Without labouring the point further, I suggest a key feature of Waltz's thought and one that genuinely distinguishes it from classical realism, is that his theory of international politics is not derived from a theory of human nature, or even explicitly in reaction to a theory of human nature -indeed 'human nature' does not even appear But, it seems, that this is actually not why he moves away from human nature.
Rather, it is first, because, in any scientific sense, the content of human nature is unknowable, but second, and more important, it is because, contra the position outlined above, human nature is actually a variable, not a constant. Thus, ' [Because] of the difficulty of knowing such a thing as a pure human nature, because the human nature we do know reflects both man's nature and the influence of his environment, definitions of human nature such as those of Spinoza and Hobbes are arbitrary and can lead to no valid social or political conclusions.' (p.166) 23 Here Waltz is discussing the critique of these accounts of human nature allegedly put forward by Montesquieu and Rousseau, but it is, I think, clear from the context that he is endorsing this position. 24 Reconstructing and rearranging his argument, it seems to be that while we humans do indeed have a nature, and, perhaps, judging from the existence of evil in the world, that nature is such that sometimes evil consequences flow from it, we can't actually specify this nature much beyond that, at least not in any scientific way, and, in any event, in practice, nature and nurture cannot be treated separately; therefore an emphasis on human nature gets us nowhere if we want to understand social phenomena.
This is quite a complex position, which touches base with the major strands of classical realist thought, but at a tangent. The initial emphasis on evil, if it were to be the case that this is indeed his emphasis, would link Waltz to the 'righteous realists', the Augustinian strand of thought identified by Joel Rosenthal, Alastair Murray and others. 25 But the Augustinians actually draw political conclusions from this position; their realism is a realism of prudence, where we are enjoined to question our own presuppositions and values (because we are fallen beings every bit as much as are our enemies), and to turn away from ambitious projects of social reform, which are doomed to failure because of the imperfect human material from which societies are constructed -human beings may strive to be moral (although, for Augustine, they can only achieve this status by God's grace, not by their own efforts), but collectivities will always be egoistic. 26 There is, I suspect, little here with which in practice Waltz would disagree (which is one of the reasons why Freyberg-Inan might be right in assigning the 'evil' statement to him) but he does not get to this position by the Politics that is his most attractive feature. 27 In short, Waltz is not an Augustinian realist, even if he shares some of the pessimism characteristic of that genre.
Neither does he follow Hobbes, Spinoza, Machiavelli et al by rooting his theory in the drives produced by an unchanging human nature. But, again, there are points of contact with this strand of realism; he may not see human nature as constant, but he does, I think, share with these authors the view that the interests of states, which are ultimately generated by human nature, are, more or less, constant -the difference being that from his perspective these interests have to be seen as exogenous to a theory of the international system. States desire to survive and it is this desire which leads them to arms-race, or form balances or whatever; we don't need to ask why states desire to survive, they just do. From his perspective, to push the question further takes us into areas which it is not reasonable to expect a theory of the international system to be concerned with. It is this approach to interests -as constant but exogenous -which has dominated the thought of the 'rational choice realists' who have built on Waltz's work to construct modern neorealism by redefining the field as the study of how egoists pursue their exogenously given interests under conditions of anarchy-and indeed of their cousins, the liberal institutionalists who have offered a different reading of the possibilities of the anarchy problematic, but take the same view of interests, (or 'preferences' as Andrew Moravcsik would have it). 28 And, of course, it is this position that has been so effectively criticised by constructivist writers such as Friedrich Kratochwil and Harald Müller; 29 values and interests should not be taken as given but must be understood as produced in discourse, that is, produced in a relationship -as Kratochwil puts it, one root of the word 'interest' is 'inter-esse', ' the in-between of the me and the you'. 30 On this account, it simply isn't possible to produce a theory of international politics that is isolated from other levels of social and inter-personal interaction.
Still, without remotely wishing to suggest that Waltz is a proto-constructivist, it seems to me that there are elements of his thinking that would be rather more compatible with this critique than one might expect; the aspects of the work of the neorealists and liberal institutionalists criticised by Kratochwil actually owe more to the Hobbesian account of human nature than they do to the more nuanced story that Waltz has to tell.
Indeed, when Waltz writes of man's nature interacting with his environment, one could almost imagine this thought being developed in the direction of Alexander
Wendt's account of the different kinds of anarchy that might emerge in different kinds of environments 31 -but, of course, Waltz does not wish to go anywhere near that position, rejecting altogether any this line of thought that relies on human nature. The point is that he excludes human nature because we can't (or at least don't) understand it, whereas the rational choice realists treat it as an exogenous variable because they believe that they do understand it, and that it generates interests the nature of which can simply be taken for granted. But, on the other hand, for Waltz although we can't (or at least don't) understand human nature, we do at least know that it is quite likely that 'our miseries are the product of our natures', which takes us back to Augustinian pessimism and away from both the rational choice realists and the constructivists.
Waltz's thought seems to oscillate between the Hobbesian and Augustinian poles, touching both while refusing to be identified with either.
Here, I suggest, is perhaps the most important, and certainly the most paradoxical, 33 Since the 1970s, however, sociobiology, rebranded as 'evolutionary psychology', has developed in ways that are far removed from the simplicities of Wilson's work, and now, I believe, demands to be taken seriously. 34 Moreover, neuroscientists such as V. S. Ramachandran and Antonio Damasio are revealing ways in which human perceptions and behaviours are crucially shaped and determined by physical processes within the brain. 35 And, to complete the picture, many cultural anthropologists are now rejecting the politicallycorrect relativism of their disciplinary forebears -perhaps rather disappointingly, it turns out that the 'coming of age on Samoa' was more or less like the coming of age everywhere else, and Donald Brown has proved that one can write a very substantial book full of 'human universals'. 36 Add all this material together and although we may not know of such a thing as a 'pure human nature', we (that is, the scientific community, broadly drawn) do know a lot more about the subject than we did thirty years ago. Does this have any implications for Waltz's position?
Scholars of international relations have been slow in coming to terms with this material, and probably the best-known work, by Bradley Thayer, is broadly supportive of rational-choice, game theoretic approaches. 37 More recent work, however, focuses on the ways in which choices are made that are not utility maximising. 38 The results here are rather sobering; for example, there is good evidence that mentally healthy people tend to exhibit psychological biases that encourage optimism; such biases, known to evolutionary psychologists as 'positive illusions', may well have been adaptive in helping our ancestors to cope with hard times, but nowadays may serve instead to get us into trouble. 39 It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of this work for international political theory, and I hope to write more extensively on this topic in the future, but obviously, any serious assessment would take us far beyond the scope of this particular article -still, it is interesting to ask whether, if it is indeed the case that we can now say rather more about human nature than we could in the 1970s, as I think it
is, does what we can now say actually support the position Waltz's took in Theory of
International Politics? Was Waltz right to resist basing his theory on human nature?
The answer, I think, is a tentative yes. Scientific work in this field has indeed identified biases in judgement some of which are relevant to any theory of foreign policy behaviour -but, of course, Waltz had no intention of producing such a theory.
At the macro level where he was working, the most relevant finding of the new learning is rather different. It is precisely that while there may be identifiable human behavioural biases and mechanisms that are the product of evolution and are constant across cultures and over time, the idea that human nature as such is a constant is not defensible. In the study quoted above, 'positive illusions' were present generally in all populations, but they varied in intensity as between individuals; mental states are important and, unsurprisingly, depressed people were less likely to have positive illusions that mentally healthy people; context is central -positive illusions are greater, for example, 'in situations of ambiguity, low feedback, and where events are difficult to verify'; culture matters, 'positive illusions are greater among Western (especially American) populations than Eastern populations' (we might have guessed that one as well) and, finally, they vary according to regime type and decision making process. 40 The point is that it is precisely because of these variations that it is possible to put together a theory which is intended to predict when positive illusions will be important -this is the goal of Dominic Johnson's recent book. 41 If there were to be such a thing as a constant 'human nature' it could not be the basis for theory, which is precisely why Waltz was right not to construct his theory on such foundations, even if this meant that, in this respect, he had to part company with his illustrious forebears.
So, to return to the starting point of this chapter, how then should we read Waltz -as one in a line of realist theorists whose work is consistent with the 'fundamental assumptions of his classical predecessors' or as a figure who has broken with the past? The answer is 'both and' rather than 'either or'. It is impossible to find any figure amongst the classics who puts things together in the same way that Waltz does, but most of the things that are put together by Waltz would be familiar to most classical writers. And this ability to take familiar material and to combine and recombine it is precisely why Waltz is an undisputed modern classic. 
